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BOOK REVIEW
ACKERMAN ON PROPERTY AND THE LAW
DAVID T. OZAR*
ACKERMAN ON PROPERTY AND THE LAW

The conventional wisdom about property law is that the foundations of the field are relatively secure and the vast majority of its
applications unequivocal. This view of property law is seriously
challenged in Bruce A. Ackerman's Private Property and the
Constitution (1977).
Ackerman's thesis is that the foundations of property law are not
secure and that its applications are confused and suffer from serious, wide-ranging ambiguities. Focusing on the compensation
clause of the fifth amendment, Ackerman argues that we lack a
clear understanding of what we mean by property and that we have
no clear criteria for determining whose property claims are superior
in disputed cases. Ackerman maintains that our legal system and
those who function within it are profoundly schizophrenic about the
nature of property, sliding back and forth between two incompatible
conceptions of property. He also maintains that three incompatible
sets of criteria are employed by the courts in determining the merits
of competing property claims. These incompatible criteria command the support of reputable legal scholars, yet few seem to recognize the precise differences between them.
To some these claims will seem outlandish. But Ackerman does
not make them lightly nor does he support them merely with airy
speculation. The heart of Ackerman's argument is, at every turn, a
finely worked analysis of cases and scholarly literature. For this
reason, Ackerman's claims cannot be taken lightly. His evidence is
concrete and specific. It is found in the cases and literature which
between them define the current state of legal understanding on this
subject. If there is schizophrenia here, it is a serious matter and
Ackerman's call to serious thinking is well uttered.
Furthermore, the courts are now facing an increasing number of
cases in which compensation is sought for actual or projected losses
as a consequence of legislation and administrative action aimed at
conservation, protection of the environment, and husbanding of re* Ass't. Prof. Department of Philosophy, Loyola University of Chicago, Adjunct Prof.
School of Law, Loyola Univ. of Chicago, Ph.D Yale Univ. (1974).
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sources. As these concerns grow in importance, as seems likely, such
cases will become more frequent and more urgent as well. It is in
these cases that our schizophrenia is most obvious. The increasing
volume and complexity of these cases will surely force us to attend
to the fundamental ambiguities and instability of our understanding of property. Far better, Ackerman proposes, to begin the reflective process now, before a crisis in our legal understanding is upon
US.

Ackerman develops a number of important distinctions in analyzing the accepted methodologies for resolving property disputes. The
two most important of these are the distinction between the
perspectives of "the Policymaker" and "the Observer" and the distinction between the users of "Ordinary Language" and "Scientific
Language." This article first will explain these two key distinctions
and several subsidiary distinctions, and then will proceed to an
explanation of Ackerman's central thesis. In the final sections, several weaknesses of Ackerman's argument will be discussed.
The Policymaker and the Observer

One of the key distinctions supporting Ackerman's analysis is the
distinction between the Policymaker' and the Observer.'
1.

Ackerman describes his "Policymaker" in this way:
On the Policymaking side, I shall place all those who understand the legal system
to contain, in addition to rules, a relatively small number of general principles
describing the abstract ideals which the legal system is understood to further. It is
this statement of principle, presumed by the Policymaker to form a self-consistent
whole, which I shall call a Comprehensive View. The rules of the system are
understood to be the product of legislative and judicial efforts to implement the
Comprehensive View in the best practical way. Hence, the function of the Comprehensive View is to provide a set of standards by which Policymakers may determine
the proper content of legal rules and evaluate the performance of the legal system
as a whole. It follows that when a Policymaker is forced to judge the merits of
competing rules in the course of making a legally binding decision, he will select
the rule which-in his best judgment-best conforms to the Comprehensive View
he has imputed to the legal system. To forestall misunderstanding, I do not want
you to think a Policymaker must impute to the legal system a Comprehensive View
of a Highly Moral variety-like that imagined by Immanuel Kant or Myres McDougal. For present purposes, it will be enough for the analyst to worship a more
mundane-if not more intelligible-God, like Bentham's Utility or Posner's Efficiency.
B. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION 11 (1977) (footnotes omitted)
[hereinafter cited as PRIVATE PROPERTY].
2. From the Observer's point of view, it seems extraordinary to begin analysis
by supposing, with the Policymaker, that legal rules ought to satisfy the demands
of a Comprehensive View. This is not to say that our Observer is an old-fashioned
Realist who argues that judges inevitably decide hard (or easy) cases on the basis
of personal predilection. Rather than dealing with straw men, we shall impute a
more sophisticated point of view to our ideal type. For him the test of a sound legal
rule is the extent to which it vindicates the practices and expectations embedded
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The Policymaker asserts that legal rules are best understood as
the implementation of general principles which together form a
Comprehensive View. The Observer, on the other hand, does not
deny that legal rules can be understood as organized around a Comprehensive View, but merely holds that legal rules can only be understood as organized around a Comprehensive View when the society's institutionally based expectations do in fact form such a
larger pattern. When social expectations do not form a unitary,
internally consistent pattern, i.e., a Comprehensive View, the Observer will select legal rules which best support the society's institutionally based expectations. A Policymaker, observing the absence
of a shared Comprehensive View, will seek to promulgate legal rules
which perpetuate the ideals embodied in the Comprehensive View
which he judges worthy of guiding the law. Understandably Observers and Policymakers will each consider the other to be either naive
or superficial. 3
Ackerman seeks to present a balanced picture of both of these
perspectives. His aim is to demonstrate the theoretical and practical
differences between the perspectives, particularly in controversies
over the meaning of just compensation. His point is that these mutually incompatible approaches are both used in practice. His aim
is not to take sides, but to help us recognize the extent of our confusion.
However, our schizophrenia is not fully manifested in the perspectives of the Observer and the Policymaker. Two very different Comprehensive Views also exercise significant influence over property
law. Ackerman labels one of these the Utilitarian and the other the
Kantian View. There are many other potential Comprehensive
in, and generated by, dominant social institutions. It follows that when an Observer
is forced to judge the merits of competing rules in the course of making a legally
binding decision, his view of the task will be quite different from that adopted by
his Policymaking brethren. Rather than grounding his decision in a Comprehensive
View stating the ideals the legal system is understood to serve, the Observer will
instead seek to identify the norms that in fact govern proper conduct within the
existing structure of social institutions. Having articulated the existing pattern of
socially based expectations as sensitively as he can, the Observer will then select
the legal rule which, in his best judgment, best supports these institutionally based
norms.
Id. at 12.
3. So far as the Observer is concerned, the Policymaker's willingness to press his concern
for consistency, generality, abstraction beyond the structure of existing social expectations
marks him out as an immature mind insisting on a clarity and comprehensiveness intrinsically unsuited for the subject . . . .In contrast, the Policymakers among us will look upon
their rivals as rather superficial types who rely on their sense of the social proprieties instead
of trying to ground their relatively concrete notions of socially legitimate expectation in a
deeper, more abstract account of the social objectives worthy of legal support.
Id. at 14. (footnote omitted).
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Views, for example, the Marxist, Maoist, Existentialist, and the
Absurdist. Ackerman has focused upon the Utilitarian and the Kantian views because these are the two which most powerfully influence our present legal culture and might reasonably be considered
legally binding.'
The Utilitarian Comprehensive View emphasizes legal rules
which maximize social utility or, in current terminology, economic
efficiency. The Policymaker who adopts a Kantian Comprehensive
View5 will criticize Utilitarianism for its failure to consider individuals and for insisting on the maximization of social satisfactions regardless of their distribution. The Kantian View insists that each
individual has certain moral rights as an autonomous being which
cannot be overridden by an appeal to general Utility.
Ackerman works out the details of this distinction in connection
with the notion of "just compensation" and in conjunction with
another set of distinctions based on his analysis of the notions of
judicial restraint and innovation. Since Ackerman's discussion of
judicial restraint and innovation is extremely valuable in itself, it
deserves some careful attention here.
Judicial Restraint and Judicial Innovation
Ackerman initially focuses on the Policymaking judge. He notes
that both Kantian and Utilitarian Policymakers agree that legal
work-product should be evaluated in terms of the extent to which
it implements the appropriate Comprehensive View. Thus, all Policymakers would understand a perfectly functioning set of institutions as one which always generates a decision that best furthers the
Comprehensive View guiding the legal system.
A perfectly restrained judge is therefore one who always reviews
the challenged decision before him as if it had been generated by a
set of perfectly functioning institutions. The perfectly restrained
judge does not necessarily believe that his society is in fact so well
ordered. He might believe it to be ill ordered, but thinks it inappropriate for the courts to take account of this in their decisions.
In contrast, the judicial innovator
• . . thinks it appropriate for a judge to take into account the fact
that, in one respect or another, the world he confronts falls short
4. "[A] judge surely is not entitled to roam the range of conceivable Comprehensive
Views with the aim of selecting the one that suits his personal fancy. Instead, whatever his
own personal predilections, the judge's choice of a legally binding Comprehensive View must

be limited ..

" Id. at 41.

5. The term "Kantian" is employed by Ackerman only to draw attention to a certain set
of general concerns, not to focus on Kant's own particular ways of formulating those concerns.
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of a "well-ordered society." Hence, after defining the respects in
which the world falls short of the "well-ordered" ideal, he will see
nothing wrong in using his judicial office to improve the existing
legal state of affairs.'

But there are a variety of ways in which a society can be well- or
ill-ordered in relation to a Comprehensive View. Ackerman divides
these into three aspects: 1) the distribution of goods and services
within the society, 2) the functioning of other governmental institutions, and 3) the attitudes of citizens towards their government. 7
Since a judge may believe his society well ordered in some or none
of these aspects, we can now identify numerous combinations of
restraint and innovation. These represent the positions which
judges actually take. Applying these distinctions to the Utilitarian
and Kantian approaches to "just compensation" enables Ackerman
to give us a rich understanding of how these Comprehensive Views
might function in practice. He also applies these distinctions to
indicate the ways the Observer judge might understand the notion
of "just compensation".
Scientific Language and Ordinary Language

The second major distinction which Ackerman employs is between "Scientific" and "Ordinary" approaches to legal language.
The Ordinary approach stresses a close relation between legal and
6.

PRIVATE PROPERTY,

supra note 1, at 36.

7. A judge could review a challenged decision before him as if his society were well-ordered
or not in each of these three respects. We may articulate this fairly precisely by saying that
the judge may either affirm (a restrained approach) or deny (an innovative approach) each
of the following propositions:
Proposition A: Judges are to assume that the distribution of property rights prevailing at Time One (i.e. the point in time before the event occurred which is the
basis of the complaint before the court) is generally consistent with the Comprehensive View they impute to the legal system, as would be the case in a well-ordered
system.
Proposition B: Judges are to assume that nonjudicial organs of government generally act consistently with the Comprehensive View they impute to the legal system,
as would be the case in a well-ordered society.
Proposition C: Judges are to assume that the litigants, as good citizens, recognize
that they are living in a well-ordered society and so will accept disadvantageous
official decisions without a deep sense of grievance, unless they have special reason
to believe that they are involved in one of the exceptional cases in which the system
has malfunctioned.
Judges who affirm Proposition A, Ackerman calls conservative; those who deny it, he calls
reformist. Insofar as a judge affirms Proposition B, Ackerman calls him deferential; insofar
as he denies it, activist. Insofar as a judge affirms Proposition C, Ackerman labels him
principled; insofar as he denies it, Ackerman labels him pragmatist, because such a judge
"think[s] it legitimate to reject a decision [he] would otherwise find legally binding in order
to check the disaffection of a significant social group which rejected the reigning Comprehen-

sive View." Id. at 38.
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non-legal language8 while the Scientific approach emphasizes the
independence and precision available in a technical legal language.,
Presumably no one seriously supports the Scientific approach
merely to mystify laymen. Rather, the Scientist claims that specialized language enables him to deal more effectively with the issues
at hand.
Ackerman's effort to explain this distinction in general terms does
not go much beyond what has just been said and his use of the
Scientific/Ordinary distinction involves serious ambiguities. These
will be examined after consideration of the two most important
applications of the distinction.
One such application, Ackerman's distinction between
"Scientific Property" and "Ordinary Property", will be examined in
the following section. Ackerman's other application is in conjunction with the Policymaker/Observer distinction. While there are
four possible combinations of these approaches to legal disputes,
Ackerman carefully examines only two of the combinations, namely
the "Scientific Policymaker" and the "Ordinary Observer." The
Scientific Policymaker, predictably, is an analyst of the law who:
(a) manipulates technical legal concepts so as to illuminate
(b) the relationship between disputed legal rules and the Comprehensive View he understands to govern the legal system. 0
In contrast the "Ordinary Observer" is an analyst who:
(a) elaborates the concepts of nonlegal conversation so as to illuminate
(b) the relationship between disputed legal rules and the structure of social expectations he understands to prevail in dominant
institutional practice."
8.

[Liegal language cannot be understood unless its roots in the ordinary talk
of non-lawyers are constantly kept in mind. While legal specialists, naturally
enough, will sometimes be called upon to make refinements generally ignored in
ordinary language, recourse to everyday, nonlegal ways of speaking can be expected
to reveal the basic structure and animating concerns of legal analysis-stripped of
the excessive technicality generated by special pleading and adversary confrontation.
Id. at 10.
9. [T]he Scientist conceives the distinctive constituents of legal discourse to
be a set of technical concepts whose meanings are set in relation to one another by
clear definitions without continuing reliance upon the way similar-sounding concepts are deployed in nonlegal talk. While the practitioner of Ordinary analysis will
find that nonlegal discourse will provide a useful perspective upon basic concepts
that may otherwise be lost in a sea of legalism, the Scientist will look upon such
an appeal to ordinary talk as the surest sign of muddle.
Id. at 10-11 (footnote omitted).
10. Id.at 15.
11. Id.
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Part of what is interesting about Ackerman's focus upon these two
approaches are his reasons for not giving serious attention to the
other two, the Ordinary Policymaker" and the Scientific Observer. 3
Ackerman grants that Scientific Observing has played an important role in legal theory in times past. But, given his purposes, he
does not judge this approach worthy of serious attention here.14
With regard to Ordinary Policymaking, Ackerman argues that
ordinary talk about our current social situation neither points to nor
expresses an underlying Comprehensive View. For this reason, the
pursuit of a Comprehensive View for the law, the adoption of a
Policymaking approach, requires a language specifically designed to
implement that Comprehensive View, i.e., a scientific language.
The approach of the Ordinary Policymaker, therefore, can make no
serious claim on our attention.' 5
The Ordinary Policymaker will hold that:
[DJeep reflection upon ordinary language and practice will reveal that [ordinary
conversation] can best be understood as organized around a set of self-consistent
principles and policies sufficiently abstract and general to qualify as a Comprehensive View. [On such an approach, it would be] unnecessary to devise a Scientific
vocabulary for the purpose of clearly and systematically developing the implications of the governing Comprehensive View to each kind of dispute brought before
the legal system. One could then operate as an effective Policymaker by thoughtfully employing the concepts of ordinary discourse in evaluating each particular
dispute.
Id. at 19-20.
13. Like the Ordinary Observer, the Scientific Observer seeks to identify the legal rules
that best support dominant social expectation. But the Scientific Observer thinks that the
patient elaboration of the structure of ordinary discourse is an unlikely means to this end.
Legal concepts, he will argue, must be based on a Scientific understanding of socially based
expectations to be gleaned, for example, from such disciplines as anthropology, history,
psychology, or sociology. Id. at 17-18.
14. During the half century between 1870 and 1920, legal scholarship was dominated by a group of scholars who believed that the disciplined investigation of the
historical common law tradition would reveal the basic principles defining legitimate social expectations. Hence the Scientific challenge to the Ordinary Observer
is not a lifeless theoretical possibility but a very real force indeed ....
Despite the potent claims of the Scientific Observer to attention, however, I have
chosen to slight his contribution . . . . [Ilt is our present thesis that the conceptual tools of Ordinary Observing are sufficiently powerful to illuminate the existing
structure of compensation doctrine in a way that a lawyer would find most revealing
...
[I]f the Scientist only succeeds by his more complex and expensive procedures in telling the Ordinary analyst what he already knows, this cannot count as
an important contribution to substantive constitutional law . ...
It is always possible, of course, that a Scientific Observer would not simply
confirm his Ordinary counterpart's understanding of social reality . . . Nonetheless, I think this theoretical possibility sufficiently unlikely that I shall postpone
its serious consideration until one or another Scientific Observer presents an account that makes the latent tension between the two forms of Observing a concrete
problem for just compensation law.
Id. at 18-19 (footnotes omitted).
15. [The approach of the Ordinary Policymaker] requires certain empirical
12.
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Moreover even if Ordinary Policymaking is not internally contradictory, Ackerman claims that there is no important Policymaking
work on the current legal scene that has adopted the Ordinary approach, while Scientific Policymaking efforts multiply. Therefore,
again, this approach does not merit serious attention here.
Scientific Property Talk and Ordinary Property Talk
Ackerman also applies the Scientific/Ordinary distinction to
"talk of property". "Scientific Property Talk" is the technical legal
terminology of property relations, used by educators and practitioners. "Ordinary Property Talk" is laymen's talk, presumably a nontechnical form of language which laymen employ in their ordinary
dealings with one another. In applying this distinction, Ackerman
considers the notion of property both generally and more specifically
with regard to the notion of "taking" under the compensation
clause.
Those who engage in Scientific Property Talk speak of property
in terms of relationships between people with respect to things.
Recognizing that all rights, including property rights, are conditional, they understand that more than one person may claim a
valid interest in a particular thing. Such claims will normally relate
to different parts or aspects of the thing. 6
assumptions about existing social practices that seem to me to be plainly false.
While, as we have seen, it is possible to imagine a Utilitarian or Kantian paradise
in which all important social practices were in fact organized around a particular
Comprehensive View, I cannot believe that I live in such a world. And if social
practices are not organized around a single Comprehensive View, it would be most
surprising if ordinary language could be so organized. After all, ordinary talk makes
sense within ordinary social structures; if these structures do not form a larger,
consistent, normative pattern, there is every reason to think that common speech
will reflect this underlying social disarray. Hence, I do not believe Ordinary Policymaking is a coherent mode of legal analysis in the social world as it is presently
constructed. If the law is to further a determinate Comprehensive View, lawyers will
require a language organized on clearer normative lines than the talk generated by
laymen having to deal with the tensions and inconsistences of their common forms
of life.
Id. at 20 (footnote omitted).
16. I think it fair to say that one of the main points of the first-year Property
course is to disabuse entering law students of their primitive lay notions regarding
ownership. They learn that only the ignorant think it meaningful to talk about
owning things free and clear of further obligation. Instead of defining the relationship between a person and "his" things, property law discusses the relationships
that arise between people with respect to things. More precisely, the law of property
considers the way rights to use things may be parceled out amongst a host of
competing resource users. Each resource user is conceived as holding a bundle of
rights vis-a-vis other potential users; indeed in the modern American system, the
way in which user rights may be legally packaged and distributed are wondrously
diverse . . . . Hence, it risks serious confusion to identify any single individual as
the owner of any particular thing. . . . Once one begins to think sloppily, it is all
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Given this conceptualization of property, a "taking" will be any
deprivation of any user right whatsoever whether this be by the
transfer of the right or by its elimination. 7 Of course the compensation clause does not prohibit takings simpliciter, but rather without
just compensation. Thus, whenever something qualifies as a taking,
the courts may be petitioned to determine what counts as just compensation. The Policymaker will resolve this question in one way
and the Observer in another as each formulates criteria for determining which property claims are superior.
Ackerman's explanation of Ordinary Property Talk is somewhat
more complicated than his explanation of Scientific Property Talk.
This is a bit surprising, in that Ackerman is presumably articulating
the ordinary layman's non-technical notions. First, Ackerman has
us consider a perfectly socialized middle-class child and ask ourselves just what he would need to learn about property in order not
to be labeled deviant. The child will first learn to distinguish his
things from those of others. He next learns that, barring exceptional
circumstances, permission is required before one person may use
another's property. He also learns that he may not use his own
things in a manner unduly harmful to others."
too easy to start thinking that "the" property owner, by virtue of being "the"
property owner, must necessarily own a particular bundle of rights over a thing.
And this is to commit the error that separates layman from lawyer. For the fact
(or is it the law?) of the matter is that property is not a thing, but a set of legal
relations between persons governing the use of things.
Id. at 26-27.
17. The real question for the law-Scientifically understood-is not to identify
"the" rights of "the" property owner through some mysterious intuitive process but
to determine in whose bundle one or another right may best be put.
It follows that when the Scientific eye scans the constitutional text, it will have
little difficulty interpreting the first part of the clause which commands "nor shall
private property be taken ....
" Scientifically understood, this phrase can only
have an extraordinarily wide application. Whenever the state takes any use right
out of Jones's bundle and puts it in any other bundle, private property should be
understood to have been taken. For it is precisely the Scientist's main point to deny
the propriety of a muddled search amongst the diverse bundles of user rights in
quest of those that contain "the" rights of property. Even if Jones's bundle contains
but a single user right, it is nonetheless protected against a taking by the clause.
And surely others should not be disadvantaged simply because their bundles contain more user rights than does that of poor Jones. It follows that a taking has
occurred whenever the law removes any user right formerly resident in one bundle
and places it in any other.
Id. at 27-28 (footnote omitted).
18. From a very early point, young Layman has been taught to distinguish
between things that are his and things that are not his. If something belongs to him,
others are under a prima facie obligation to ask his permission before using it; they
are justified in using his things without obtaining Layman's permission only if they
have some especially compelling reason for this extraordinary action. In contrast,
Layman may properly use his things in a large number of ways without asking
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On this view, in order to answer the question whether a taking has
occurred, we must answer two questions:
1. Has the state taken one of Layman's things away from him?
2. If a taking has occurred, can it be justified on the ground that
it was necessary to stop Layman from engaging in conduct he
ought, as a well-socialized adult, to have recognized as unduly
harmful to others?
But even this does not give us a complete picture of Ordinary
Property or of a taking of it. Ackerman offers a further distinction
on which much of his analysis of Ordinary Property depends. He
distinguishes between "Social Property" and "Legal Property".
Ackerman's aim is to capture the notion that, from the Ordinary
perspective, "it makes good sense to discriminate between two types
of rights bundle [sic] and to think of one set as realizing the 'true
nature' of property far more completely than the other."' 9 What is
the difference between these two types of "rights bundle"? With
regard to most things, Layman has no need of a lawyer to determine
if something is his property. But with regard to a relatively few
things, Layman cannot determine, without lawyers' help, whether
the thing is his property or not. Ackerman calls the former "Social
Property" and the latter "Legal Property."20
anybodyis permission. Even Layman, however, cannot use his things in absolutely
any way he wants; instead he is taught to refrain from actions that, as a wellsocialized child, he should know are unduly harmful to others ....
. . . [Wihile I would anticipate different subcultures to hold disparate ideas
ofwhat constitutes an "exceptional" circumstance that justifies somebody else
(Johnny) in using Layman's bicycle without his permission, I would not expect a
great deal of dispute on the point that there must be something exceptional about
the situation to justify the use of the bike. Otherwise the bike was not Layman's in
the first place but belonged, at best, to both Johnny and Layman ....
...
. [WIhile the Scientist rebels at the thought that a single person can be
properly identified as the owner of a thing, the Ordinary Observer takes a very
different view. A particular thing is Layman's thing when: (a) Layman may, without negative social sanction, use the thing in lots more ways than others can; and
(b) others need a specially compelling reason if they hope to escape the negative
social sanctions that are normally visited upon those who use another's things
without receiving his permission.
Id. at 97-100 (footnote omitted).
19. Id. at 116.
20. Illf Layman usually does not perceive the need of a lawyer's advice before
saying that something is his, upon what precisely does he ground his claim?
He bases it on the fact that his right to control the use of his thing is generally
recognized in his everyday dealings with other well-socialized individuals. That is,
others will ask his permission to use his thing before doing so; similarly, they will
not interfere with many of the ways he can make use of his thing . ...
....
[Slome of the time Layman will himself perceive the need to consult a
lawyer before he can knowledgeably claim some thing as his. On rare occasions, for
example, another well-socialized person will make a claim of right to one of Lay-

1979 ]

Ackerman

Layman can identify his Social Property. He considers himself
the full-fledged "owner", and this judgment is supported by existing
social practices. "In contrast Layman must recognize that his claim
upon Legal Property is far more tenuous - since only a lawyer could
tell him whether it was his in the first place."'"
This distinction between Social and Legal Property is particularly
important when applied to takings. The ease with which Layman
can identify his Social Property means that he will have no difficulty recognizing a taking of that property. But when Layman's
property claim is supportable only by reference to the opinion of a
legal expert, rather than to manifest social practice, then he is less
certain when such property has been taken. That is, with regard to
Legal Property, Ordinary Property Talk is unable to clearly identify
a taking.
Ackerman's Central Thesis
Now we are in a position to explain Ackerman's central thesis that
two mutually incompatible conceptions of property, and three fundamentally different sets of criteria for resolving conflicting property claims, are currently operative in our legal system. With the
help of the distinctions examined above, Ackerman constructs sophisticated models of judicial reasoning, models of both Kantian
and Utilitarian Scientific Policymaking and a model of the Ordinary Observer. Ackerman uses these models to interpret dozens of
court opinions involving the compensation clause and to analyze the
writings of legal scholars and theorists as well. Against this background he reaches several conclusions.
First, there is a long tradition of interpreting and applying the
compensation clause in the manner of the Ordinary Observer. The
Ordinary conception of property has tended to dominate in judicial
opinions for many years and there is a long tradition of determining
criteria for "just compensation" on the basis of the structure of
dominant social expectations, identified by ordinary means.
man's things. It will then be necessary for both to consult lawyers (and perhaps
judges) to determine who has the better claim. Similarly, the rights that Layman
possesses over a thing may be of such a kind that they cannot be evidenced by a
reference to existing patterns of social restraint and practice . . . .Layman will
make a fundamental distinction between his social property and his legal property.
As to social property, Layman will claim to be in a position to point to existing
social practices which any well-socialized person should recognize as marking a
thing out as Layman's thing. If, however, Layman does not believe himself justified
in claiming something as his without appealing to the opinion of a legal specialist,
then I shall say he has only legal, but not social, property, in the thing in question.
Id. at 116-17 (footnotes omitted).
21. Id. at 118 (footnote omitted).
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Nevertheless, in spite of its historical position, the Ordinary Observer's approach has proved inadequate to deal with conflicts involving Legal Property because of the difficulty of determining
when Legal Property has been taken. Consider for example,
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,2 2 which Ackerman examines in
somewhat simplified form.
A coal company sold the surface rights to a certain parcel of land,
L, to a certain person, P, reserving the right to extract the subsurface anthracite even if this should cause damage to P's surface
activities. These mining rights had recently been rendered worthless
by a Pennsylvania statute making extraction illegal if it caused
subsidence. The company went to court to recover compensation.
The Scientist would have no trouble recognizing a taking here and
would move immediately to ask what constitutes "just compensation." It is less clear whether, from the perspective of Ordinary
Property Talk, a taking had occurred.
If P had attempted to mine his land and had accordingly paid
rent, or if the company's claim to the subsurface was in some other
manner based on actual social practice, then the company's claim
to the subsurface would have been Social Property. But the company's claim rested only on an impressive piece of paper in which
subsurface mining rights were reserved to it. Consequently, the
company's claim was merely a matter of Legal Property. It was
therefore not clear whether a taking had occurred or not.
The choice before the court, which approached the case from an
Ordinary point of view, was clear. Either Legal Property, something
not clearly owned, was to be treated like Social Property, the things
held by full-fledged owners, and the coal company was to be granted
compensation; or alternatively, the coal company was to be treated,
not as the owner of something, but as someone possessed of certain
legally packaged expectations having no basis in social practice and
so beyond the scope of the compensation clause. Mr. Justice
Holmes's opinion in this case, written from the Ordinary point of
view, opts for the former approach, even though it apparently contradicts in effect, if not in word, the distinction between Social
Property and Legal Property on which it is founded.222.
23.

260 U.S. 393 (1922).
Holmes took the first path. As was to be expected, however, he did not
justify his choice by arguing its affirmative attractions but by emphasizing the
dangers that might possibly be hidden down the second highway. Down this road,
it was claimed, the far-sighted Ordinary jurist could discern the end of all constitutional protection of property, social as well as legal: if the state can take Lawyer's
things [Legal Property] without compensation, why can it not take Layman's
things [Social Property] as well? ....
Of course, even the most committed Ordinary judge cannot be affirmatively happy with this result, since it is Ordinary only
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The third point of Ackerman's thesis is that there is a growing
tendency, especially on the part of academic lawyers, to reject the
Observer's criterion of dominant social expectations and to replace
it with the more orderly and systematic reasonings of the Policymaker. Current trends of legal thinking, associated with names like
Posner and Calabresi, stress the notion of economic efficiency
within a Utilitarian Policymaking approach. At the same time,
though with less measurable impact on the courts, there is a growing
interest among legal scholars and theorists in the Kantian approaches to law embodied in the philosophical work of such thinkers
as John Rawls, 4 Robert Nozick, 5 and Ronald Dworkin." Thus,
three fundamentally different ways of establishing criteria for resolving property disputes exist within our legal culture: that of the
Ordinary Observer, the Scientific Utilitarian Policymaker and the
Scientific Kantian Policymaker.
Those who support Scientific Policymaking face the fundamental
question of whether the Comprehensive View ought to be Utilitarian, Kantian, or some other. Ackerman holds that it remains an
open question which, if any, of the Scientific Policymaking approaches ought to be considered legally binding. None of these approaches can seriously claim to represent the current animating
spirit of our legal system. But the alternative, the approach of the
Ordinary Observer, seems seriously flawed by an inadequate conception of property. Moreover, the extent of this inadequacy will
continue to increase in direct proportion to the community's increasing concern with environmental problems and conservation.
Ackerman sums up his diagnosis of current legal culture regarding
property in these words:
On the one hand, traditional doctrine is in fact grounded upon the
principles of Ordinary Observing. On the other hand, sophisticated
lawyers and judges of the present day-especially those apt to
write articles or opinions that have a general impact-are increasin form and not in substance [because precisely what it does is set aside the
fundamental distinction between ownership as such, "Social Property," and other
lesser, incomplete property claims, "Legal Property"]. As a consequence, it is not
surprising to observe Holmes-often so eager to lay down hard and fast objectivelooking rules-insisting that the issue before him turns on "a question of degree and
therefore cannot be disposed of by general propositions." Having vindicated the
constitutional status of Lawyer's things [Legal Property], Holmes senses that he
is on uncertain ground and refuses to hand down a rule of any generality to govern
the taking of Legal, as opposed to Social, rights.
Id. at 164-65 (footnotes omitted).
24. J. RAwLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
25. R. NozIcK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (1974).
26. R. DwoRKlN, TAKING R GHTS SERIOUSLY (1977).
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ingly inclined to think about the law in Scientific Policymaking
terms . .

.

.[T]he subterranean conflict between the two forms

of legal thought expresses itself on the surface of professional life
by the common perception that takings law is incoherent, its principles altogether mysterious. If I am right, before we can hope to
demystify the law it will be necessary to take a self-conscious position on the relative merits of Scientific Policymaking and Ordinary
Observing as alternative modes of legal analysis.
It is true, of course, that this call for methodological selfconsciousness is an unfamiliar one. At least so far as I can see, our
legal culture is sufficiently disorganized (or should I say schizoid?)
that many of its principal actors-lawyers, judges, legislators-move back and forth between the perspectives of the Ordinary Observer and Scientific Policymaker quite effortlessly with no
sense of impropriety ....

It takes little foresight, however, to predict that this age of
happy ignorance is drawing to a close. 7
We shall soon have little option but to respond, in one way or
another, to the ambiguities and instability of our system of property
law. Ackerman's book summons us to serious reflection, theorizing
and philosophizing about the law, so that the changes in our property law will be brought about self-consciously, as a consequence of
rational deliberation on the alternatives.
OrdinaryLaymen's Property and Ackerman's Notion of "Ordinary"
In the pages that follow, I shall examine some of the weaknesses
of Ackerman's position and shall propose an important perspective
on property which I believe he has overlooked. Ackerman's analysis
of Ordinary Property Talk is, as I mentioioned above, surprisingly
complicated for something that is supposed to be "ordinary" and
non-technical. In order to explain the layman's distinction between
ownership as such and other, lesser property relations, Ackerman
introduces the abstract and quite technical (i.e. "Scientific") notion
of Legal Property. No laymen that I know include such a notion in
their ordinary property talk.
How does Ackerman come to talk of Legal Property? He first asks
how a layman would explain his conviction that he owns a particular thing. Ackerman says Layman would answer this question by
pointing to a pattern of existing social practices, including restraint
from using the thing without Layman's permission, and not interfering with Layman's use. This focus on social relations is why Ackerman calls this kind of property claim "Social Property". Surely
27.

PRIVATE PROPERTY,

supra note 1, at 168-69.
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these practices do typify factors indicative of ownership. But they
are the consequences of ownership, not the bases of the claim to
ownership. Laymen do not look to these things to find out if they
own a thing.
If some individual, or even the entire community, were to fail to
act according to these patterns, it is unlikely that a layman, sincerely convinced that he owned something, would therefore consider
changing his conviction. Rather he would claim that those failing
to conform to these practices were failing to respect his ownership.
Moreover, if asked how he knew that he owned the thing, even under
circumstances in which the whole community was acting as if he did
not, he would not necessarily have nothing to say, as Ackerman's
position would require.
Indeed the social practices which Ackerman focuses upon are not
conclusive indications of ownership. For the same social practices
would generally exist if Layman had only been loaned the thing or
had rented it. Thus, Ackerman's social practices do not necessarily
point to ownership, as such, at all.
The explanat[on of ownership claims offered most frequently by
ordinary laymen is probably, "I bought it." The explanation behind
the owning of the money used to buy things, is most often, "I earned
it." Another important explanation is, "I received it as a gift (from
someone who owned it)." And in other situations there are several
others: "I found it," "I made it," and "I exchanged something
(which I already owned) for it."
These explanations, as part of a framework of human social practices, point to a conception of ownership quite different from either
of the conceptions examined by Ackerman. Moreover, this third
conception of property, once formulated clearly, seems more likely
to represent the actual practice of ordinary laymen than Ackerman's notion of Ordinary Property.
To strengthen this claim, consider Ackerman's analysis of the
layman's view of the "lesser property claims," i.e., property claims
which fall short of being full-fledged ownership. The layman's typical understanding of these claims, according to Ackerman, is that
Layman is unable to be certain about them without the aid of a
lawyer. Thus, Ackerman calls these claims "Legal Property."
Claims of this sort, he says, are inherently tenuous. In fact, however,
the vast majority of laymen are quite able to explain the bases of
lesser property claims. In general their explanations will point to:
(i.) an express or implied contractual agreement actually agreed
to or, under special circumstances, reasonably imputed to
(ii.) an owner (who could, in turn, justify his claims as the owner
of the thing by reference to the six explanations noted above).
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My first point in criticism of Ackerman, then, is that his analysis
of ordinary laymen's conceptions of property is incorrect. First, he
is incorrect in attributing the conception which he calls "Ordinary
Property" to ordinary laymen. Second and more important, he
misses the conception of property which ordinary laymen actually
employ. This third conception of property, which I shall call
"Ordinary Laymen's Property" to distinguish it from Ackerman's
Ordinary Property, is probably the dominant understanding of the
nature of property in our society.
It is, however, one thing to say that Ordinary Laymen's Property
is the dominant conception of the nature of property in our society,
and quite another to claim a concomitant influence upon judicial
opinion or legal theory. Such a claim could be substantiated only
by the same kind of careful analysis of case law and legal scholarship which Ackerman undertakes for his two conceptions of property. Nevertheless, it is worth suggesting that this third conception
of property might be as socially pervasive as the other two in our
current legal culture, so that our schizophrenia might be even more
complex than Ackerman claims. Alternatively, we might find the
opinions and legal theories, which Ackerman explains by reference
to his notion of Ordinary Property, might be better understood in
terms of Ordinary Laymen's Property.
Admittedly, I have only barely sketched the conception which I
am calling "Ordinary Laymen's Property." Before expanding this
notion more fully it seems worth asking how so careful an investigator as Ackerman could have overlooked the dominant conception of
property among laymen in our society, particularly when he claims
to be looking directly at laymen's ways of thinking when he constructs his notion of Ordinary Property. I think the reasons are
twofold.
Ackerman's analysis of the Ordinary conception of property is
deficient due to an ambiguity in his notion of "Ordinary." Ackerman employs this notion in four or five different ways in the course
of his analysis. The main elements of Ackerman's central thesis are
in no way weakened by this confusion, especially when the primary
meaning of the Scientific/Ordinary distinction as it functions in
relation to the central thesis is explained. But such confusion does
mar the clarity of his analysis and explains, in part, why he overlooks Ordinary Laymen's Property.
The first meaning of "Ordinary" is that used in connection with
the Scientific/Ordinary distinction. There Ackerman says the Ordinary approach holds that "recourse to everyday, nonlegal ways of
speaking can be expected to reveal the basic structure and animat-
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ing concerns of legal analysis. ' 2 The Scientist, on the other hand,
"conceives the distinctive constituents of legal discourse to be a set
of technical concepts whose meanings are set in relation to one
another by clear definitions without continuing reliance upon the
way similar-sounding concepts are deployed in nonlegal talk. 2 9 The
focus is on the contrast between the technical language of professional lawyers, which obtains its conceptual clarity by means of
stipulative definitions accepted by the profession, and the language
of non-lawyers regarding the same matters.
Ackerman apparently has the same notion of Scientific/Ordinary
in mind when he designates the conception of property which he
attributes to lawyers as "Scientific" and the conception which he
attributes to laymen as "Ordinary". Unfortunately, Ackerman's
Ordinary Property is not the conception of ordinary laymen at all.
Besides this, Ackerman's Ordinary Property is a fairly technical
notion, involving as it does the distinction between Social Property
and Legal Property, concepts which are associated with the notions
of ownership and other lesser property relations by a process much
akin to stipulative definition. Thus there is a second use of "Ordinary" which appears when Ackerman contrasts the Scientific and
the Ordinary conceptions of property. The contrast intended here
is between lawyers' and laymen's ways of thinking about property.
So "Ordinary" here really means simply "lay." As I have argued,
however, the conception Ackerman calls "Ordinary" is not the conception of property that laymen embrace.
A third use of the Scientific/Ordinary distinction occurs in Ackerman's discussion of "Scientific Observing." In this context, "Scientific" refers to the employment of a specialized investigative methodology (e.g. anthropology, history, psychology, sociology) and the
technical language that goes with it. By implication, "Ordinary" in
this context refers to the absence of such a specialized investigative
methodology. Thus the Ordinary Observer is one who would determine dominant patterns of social expectations simply by the normal
processes of observation and reflection.
A fourth use of the Scientific/Ordinary distinction appears in
Ackerman's account of the difference between Scientific and Ordinary Policymakers. Here, what the Ordinary approach lacks, which
the Scientific approach has, is the capacity for developing a relatively general system of normative principles and for systematically
deriving consequences by applying these principles in particular
cases. Ackerman tries to attribute this difference to the different
28.
29.

Id. at 10.
Id. at 10-11 (footnote omitted).
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levels of technical sophistication in language. But the thrust of the
difference relates less to linguistic power and more to the difference
between a Policymaker and an Observer. In other words, Ackerman
assimilates the notion of what is Ordinary here to the approach of
the Observer. Given this, it is not surprising that he finds the idea
of an Ordinary Policymaker all but self-contradictory, or at least
self-defeating. For, on these terms, an Ordinary Policymaker is an
Observer Policymaker, which is impossible in principle.
Thus the shifting character of Ackerman's notion of "Ordinary"
makes his argument against the possibility of an Ordinary Policymaker suspect, and suggests one reason why his notion of Ordinary
Property misses its intended mark, the conception of property of the
ordinary layman. But this confusion does not weaken Ackerman's
central thesis. For, in every key argument relevant to the central
thesis, Ackerman consistently employs the Scientific/Ordinary distinction in a single way. At every turn of the argument, "Scientific"
can be taken to indicate that the conception of property which
Ackerman calls "Scientific" is being used and "Ordinary" can be
taken to indicate that the conception of property which Ackerman
calls "Ordinary" is being used. Thus a Scientific Policymaker is a
Policymaker who employs the conception of property labeled "Scientific" by Ackerman, and an Ordinary Observer is an Observer
who uses the conception of property labeled "Ordinary." Here we
have a fifth use of the Scientific/Ordinary distinction, but one which
he uses consistently and predictably throughout the book when the
arguments for the central thesis of the book are at stake.
Ordinary Laymen's Property and the Possibility of Ordinary
Policymaking
In this section I shall briefly outline the main elements of the
conception of property which I have labeled "Ordinary Laymen's
Property." Then I wish to propose the possibility of an Ordinary
Policymaking approach to property law and compensation based on
that conception of property. In order to do this I shall also need to
examine again Ackerman's arguments against the feasibility of an
Ordinary Policymaking approach.
The central idea of Ordinary Laymen's Property is that persons
control things. That is, persons determine how things are to be used,
modified, and consumed in furtherance of their goals and purposes.
Certain kinds of this control are respected, protected, and if necessary restored by their fellow men. Both ownership and lesser property relations are relationships of control between person and thing
which the person's fellowmen respect, protect, and if necessary restore. The difference between ownership and lesser property relations
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lies in the fact that the fellowmen of the holder of a lesser property
relation will respect, etc., only such acts of control on the part of
that person as are assigned to him, explicitly or implicitly, by the
person who actually owns the thing, while the relationship between
owner and fellowmen is not necessarily dependent on the will of any
identifiable third party.
In the previous section I mentioned six types of explanation that
a layman might give, depending on the circumstances, to justify his
conviction that he owned something. All six refer to the acquisition
of control over a thing. Two concern the original initiation of control: "I found it," and "I made it." The rest refer to transfer of
control: "I exchanged something for it," "I received it as a gift," "I
earned it," and "I bought it." (The question whether these are four
distinct explanations or whether one or other of the last two is an
instance of the first one is a question beyond the scope of this
paper.) Notice, however, that these six are not the only conceivable
ways of initiating or transfering control. These are ways whose consequences our fellowmen do respect etc. There are other ways (e.g.
"I burgled it," "I robbed someone of it," "I defrauded someone of
it," and the like) whose consequences our fellowmen will not respect, protect or restore.
This then is the general framework within which ordinary laymen
buy, sell, own, loan, give gifts, earn their living, and so on. Obviously this is only a preliminary sketch of Ordinary Laymen's Property. Much more is needed to explain how it applies, for example,
to owning by groups and to owning of things other than chattels and
land. But here I have tried to sketch the conception only enough to
give the reader a sense of its general approach and to raise the
question in the reader's mind whether this conception does not represent ordinary laymen's understanding of property more accurately
than Ackerman's Ordinary Property."
Would it be possible to construct a Comprehensive View which
would take Ordinary Laymen's Property as its conception of property in the same way that the Scientific Policymaker works with
what Ackerman calls the "Scientific" conception of property? The
crucial question here is whether a system of relatively general normative principles could be developed which would justify practices
of respect, protection, and restoration on the part of the community
for certain specific kinds of control of (certain specific kinds of)
things and which would justify the community's respect etc. for the
30. This conception of property, particularly the emphasis on control of a thing, is explained in much greater detail in my doctoral dissertation, D. Ozar, The Concept of Owning
(March, 1974) (Yale University).
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consequences of the various types of original initiation of control
and of transfer of control listed above. There seems to be no reason
in principle why this could not be done. It is possible that no one
would ever actually do it and it is possible that our actual practice,
our acceptance of all six of the above explanations, involves some
hidden incoherence. But Ackerman has shown nothing selfcontradictory or self-defeating about such a project that would detain a serious thinker from attempting it.
There is, moreover, positive evidence that a Comprehensive View
employing the conception of Ordinary Laymen's Property can be
constructed. This evidence is of two sorts. First, political philosophers and social, political, and legal theorists have tried to articulate Comprehensive Views incorporating this basic conception of
property. John Locke's effort to justify property claims in terms of
labor is one example. 3' Robert Nozick's recent explanation of
"entitlement theory" is another. 31 It might be argued that these
theorists have not yet succeeded in articulating a single Comprehensive View based on Ordinary Laymen's Property; but then neither
have Ackerman's Utilitarian or Kantian -Policymakers with their
Scientific conceptions of property. I suggest that the property language of ordinary laymen is not an impossible foundation for a
Comprehensive View.
Additionally, many ordinary laymen who depend on the six explanations noted above to support their property claims consider
these explanations to provide not merely a legal, but also a moral
justification for their claims. That is, many laymen believe that if
any of these explanations were not accepted as a legal justification
for property claims, then it ought to be. Such convictions, while
perhaps not as widespread as the conception of Ordinary Laymen's
Property itself, are surely not confined to a few individuals. However, such convictions make no sense except in the presence of a
supporting rationale, including a moral justification for the claims
of those who initiated control over particular pieces of property
along with basic moral principles to be used in judging the adequacy
of exchange transactions. Admittedly, few who believe their property claims to be both legally and morally justified have developed
such a comprehensive rationale embodying and articulating all relevant normative principles. However, the evidence of serious efforts
to understand and formulate support for these convictions demonstrates that those who employ the notion of "Ordinary Layman's
Property," are not necessarily trapped into the pattern of nonsyste31.
32.

J. LOCKE, Two TREATIsEs
See note 25, supra.

OF GOVERNMENT: OF PROPERTY

(P. Laslett ed. 1963).
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matic and merely particularized judgments suggested by Ackerman's argument against an Ordinary Policymaker.
In light of these reflections, I draw the following conclusions.
First, Ackerman overlooks the conception of property employed by
the vast majority of laymen in our society. While the impact of this
oversight on Ackerman's central thesis is uncertain, the oversight is
still significant, partly because of the light this conception might
cast on Ackerman's analysis and partly because of its own importance within our society.
Second, Ackerman overlooks, indeed wrongly rejects, the possibility of a Comprehensive View employing the ordinary laymen's conception of property. This rejection may be more understandable
once we realize its dependence on Ackerman's ambiguous use of his
notion of "Ordinary." It is also more understandable when we consider the conception of property which Ackerman attributes to laymen. But Ackerman's rejection of Ordinary Policymaking still
sounds very much like a rejection of the possibility of systematic
reflection by laymen generally. Ackerman implies that only a professional, armed with his technical linguistic tools and exposed to
his professional associates, can possibly articulate a coherent system of general principles for human life. Yet Ackerman offers no
strong argument to show that careful reflection on ordinary practices and ordinary ways of speaking cannot really provide a solid
33
base for such a coherent system.
Third, I have made a positive proposal that Ordinary Laymen's
Property serve as the basis of a Comprehensive View in an Ordinary
Policymaking approach to property law. The positive evidence that
I have offered supporting such an approach is suggestive only, not
conclusive. Sincere attempts to identify the layman's conception of
property, followed by serious philosophical and theoretical reflection on the basis of that conception are needed to formulate a Comprehensive View to guide our resolution of property conflicts. We
must also examine the significance of this conception of property
and the Comprehensive View associated with it in judicial opinions
33. One wonders if Ackerman has decided ahead of time that laymen cannot be trusted
with this task. Ackerman never says such a thing and might be chagrined that such an
impression could be read from his words. But the role of laymen in the determination of what
the law ought to be gets short shrift throughout the book. This is particularly obvious in his
rejection of Ordinary Policymaking and in his discussion of the "critical" state, in which
judges and legal theorists alone are mentioned in the role of "critics" determining the principles and policies which satisfy the state's standards of right. PRIVATE PRopERTy, supra note
1, at 180-81.
At least some notice of the role of the rest of the community and of the political process by
which they participate in these determinations would enrich the picture of a legal system
which Ackerman presents.
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and in legal theory. But the first step in this long process is the
articulation of the conception I have called "Ordinary Laymen's
Property" and the formulation of a Comprehensive View based on
that conception.
Finally, however, I must say that Ackerman's arguments for his
central thesis are impressive. Though I find flaws in some of the
details, his claim that our current legal culture is schizophrenic in
its understanding of the nature of property and in the criteria it
employs to resolve competing claims is well defended. His call to
serious reflection and philosophizing about our property law is certainly well uttered. He leaves us with a new awareness of a task to
be undertaken and he has provided us with some valuable tools to
use in undertaking it.
CONCLUSION

In my opinion, the best way for the interested reader to begin this
task would be to read Ackerman's book. Despite its flaws and oversights, Private Property and the Constitutionis extraordinarily valuable for the penetrating new questions it asks, the rich new insights
it prompts, and the powerful analytical tools it makes available.
This is a book that I recommend highly to everyone: to practicing
lawyers with a theoretical bent in need of stimulation; to law students desirous of a powerful, self-contained learning experience; to
teaching lawyers seeking a rich learning experience or a useful
teaching text; to legal scholars and theorists; and to laymen in
search of a challenging but comprehensible initiation into legal
theory on a topic that is very close to home.
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